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Introduction  
The attractiveness of the work of Herbert A. Simon (1916 - 2001) can be compared in 
the context of economic theory to the remarkable influence of Thomas S. Kuhn in the 
historiography of the natural sciences. While Kuhn concentrated its efforts on 
identifying diachronic aspects of rationality in the development of physical theories 
(Kuhn 1972), Simon is recognized by a broad cross-disciplinary course that includes 
economic rationality, organizational theory, public administration, philosophy of 
evolution programming models and artificial intelligence (Simon 1960, 1962, 1967, 
1976, 1979, 1987, 1991, 2000, 2003, 2004)
1
.  
Furthermore, Simon and Kuhn are inheritors of one of the most critical stages of 
scientific knowledge and the nature of human understanding. But while Thomas S. 
Kuhn interprets a specific field of natural sciences, Herbert A. Simon holds a diversified 
multidisciplinary creativity (Dasgupta 2003). Kuhn shared the developments of the 
epistemology of science as a historian of classical and contemporary physics. On the 
contrary, Simon conceived economic theory as an administrator, engineer, architect or 
student of biology (Leahey, 2003). The discipline of economics is to Herbert A. Simon 
a way of understanding the fundamental aspects of human knowledge and behavior 
(Schwartz 2002; March - Augier 2004). 
Herbert A. Simon is one of the creators of artificial intelligence programs with 
extensions to the theory of rational decisions and management behavior of firms (Simon 
1973, 1980, Chen 2005). Such as, his accomplishments heuristic game theory and 
collective rationality are being integrated into models used for administration and 
finance, theory of public expenditure programming and argumentative (Shu-Heng Chen, 
2005, Esther-Mirjam Sent 2004, Augier-March 2004). 
When the debate on institutions and economic theory is crucial, and both firms 
and organizations question their place in a society with huge inequalities in income and 
quality of life proper to go with the economic debate with questions from the 
perspective of Herbert A. Simon, What kind of rationality that inspires the distribution 
of public expenditure? How to improve the working environment of the organization, 
What influences does the rationality of personal behavior in the collective spirit and 
identity of the company? How could the utility functions with social equity criteria?, 
                                                             
1 Herbert A. Simon received a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago. He was Professor 
of Management and Head of Industrial Department in the Graduate School of Industrial Administration of 
Carnegie Institute of Technology. He received the Nobel Prize in Economics 1978. 
What to do when the media fail organizational? How to link the efficiency and 
performance programs of better quality of life of workers in companies? 
With the evolution of theories about organizations and the fundamental changes 
in information technology (Egidi - Marengo 2001), the need to complement these 
changes from a broader concept of collective rationality, with the effects and impact of 
programming models in enterprises and the creation of digital communication systems, 
economic theory is found again midway between abstract mathematical modeling and 
common sense (Simon 1978). Thus, for this kind of complexity that accompanies the 
main transformations of contemporary society to propose some ideas of Herbert A. 
Simon may be theoretically edifying. 
This article presents some reflections from Herbert Simon's work with the following 
aims:  
1. Identify certain features of the critique of Herbert A. Simon the conventional 
approach. 
2. Exposing the epistemological implications of the theory of bounded 
rationality of Herbert Simon.  
3. Suggest some notes from the reading of Herbert A. Simon for institutional 
economics.  
 
In fact, the thesis that runs throughout the analysis is simple: the theory of Herbert A. 
Simon is a powerful model for understanding organizational economics and institutional 
theory, and its rediscovery is needed to understand the heuristics of the contemporary 




Simon's critique of the conventional approach  
During the '60s, Herbert A. Simon and James March, write an original work entitled 
Organizations (1987, 1994) leading to a paradigm shift on the approach to the 
bureaucratic organization proposed by Max Weber. The authors summarize this book a 
variety of field experiences and research results confronted empirically that brings out 
certain anomalies in the functioning of the bureaucratic scheme of the organization. In 
its findings, Simon and March show how some inconsistencies in the Weberian model 
of bureaucracy may be one reason both for its durability crisis (March - Simon 2003).  
Not only but also the pyramid base of corporate governance scolds Weberian 
with structural changes from horizontal achievement of agreements between employers 
and employees. A conventional theory of the organization also opposed changes from 
new information and communication systems. Organizations must be interpreted 
                                                             
2 The author develops the epistemological scope of the theory of Herbert Simon (Earl - Elgar 2001).  
dynamically from the theory of natural evolution, suggests Herbert A. Simon, when 
economists preferred model of mechanistic explanation (Simon - Kulkarni 1988).  
Remember that Herbert A. Simon is a precursor of cognitive movement in 
organizations (Langlois 2003). An organization evolves from a collection of options in 
response to situations, issues and feelings looking for solutions to problematic situations 
of conflict and where necessary make decisions or looking for topics that can become 
answers, in organizations, those makers decisions are always in a job search
3
. 
Consequently, Simon sees the dynamics of the organization in terms of constant 
evolution between decisions that are the result of a process of reasoning of the agents 
involved. The philosophy of the organizations account for less than the identity of a 
group of bureaucrats to the achievement of daily goals agreed between employers and 
employees:  
Often discussions of centralization and administrative decentralization will end 
up in the question "Who is the decision maker?" This question is meaningless, because 
a complex decision is like a great river that draws its many tributaries the many 
assumptions that compose it. In the same way, there are many people and organizational 
units that give to every major decision, and the problem of centralization and 
decentralization is in order this complex system in an effective scheme (Simon 1962, 
XII) 
This conception of business organization gives us a first idea about Simon's 
criticism of the conventional model. Recall that the bureaucracy in the Weberian 
organizational structure would function as long as the decisions were the result of ex 
ante planning. The framework is supported decisions on the criteria of power and 
delegated authority (Perrow 1991). Herbert A. Simon says flaws in this view, one of the 
most important, lacks of incentives and the substrate emotional decisions. Again, Simon 
appeals to biology to show the progress of organizations in terms of adaptations by trial 
and error struggles (Richard N. Langlois 2003). We never have conclusive answers to 
hand off the crisis of the organization since in each case is required to develop new 
skills and make decisions within limited ranges of information
4
. 
Herbert A. Simon sees the task of administration as a necessary task in the 
organization when it takes a practical rationality in decision-making (in terms of 
organizational goals). The criterion of rationality in the conventional version 
highlighted the results of the processes; the rationality of the conventional model is as a 
device that draws the ends. Nevertheless, Simon believes that one of the greatest 
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 According to Simon though people may try to be rational, can rarely meet the requirements of 
information or provision that imposes rational models. 
4 For Simon adaptation in the organizational context may be at the individual level through learning, 
initiation of workers, or may be in the population level through differential survival and reproduction of 
the most successful employees. In one way or another, the consequences of adaptive processes are often 
difficult to deduce where there are many interacting agents following rules that have nonlinear effects 
(Simon, 1995) 
strengths for the growth of the companies was their ability to expose openly the 
possibility of making sound decisions that positively affect the interests of managers 
and subordinates. Discussing and examining the media. As the primary refer to for 
organizational decisions would not be a board of corporate governance, but a 
philosophy of collective actions reasonably identified by each worker in a deliberative 
work environment (Simon 1991). 
We must remember that Simon began his work in public administration and 
research as a consultant. As a result of his act as a catalyst in various universities could 
integrate their experience various aspects of administration in both the private and 
public sector (March - Augier 2002). At Carnegie-Mellon University (Pittsburgh) 
deepened as it relates to the theory of decision-making use of computers to simulate 
human thought. Subsequently, Simon's work with computer programming models 
contributed to a tighter integration between information technologies and systems, 
collective decision-making (Shu-Heng Chen, 2005, pp. 121 -131)
5
.  
For Herbert A. Simon is synonymous with management decisions, but their main 
interest was to emphasize the "how." The source is reflective of his theory of practical 
rationality (Simon 1978, 1982; Simon - Kotorky 1990, 2002). Corporate decisions are 
important as they can be effective and deliver results. He suggested that the overall 
process of decision-making there are three main stages:  
 
(a) Finding cases where there is a decision to take; we can associate with an 
intelligence activity in the military sense. 
(b) Inventing, developing and analyzing possible courses of action, which might 
be called a design activity.  
(c) By choosing a particular course of action of all possible options, representing 
an activity "option / choice" or "optional."  
 
Corporate decisions are not carried out in empty. They are taken due to specific 
conditions need it: change the marketing systems, improve communication, integrate 
more employees, lay off workers, increase sales, cut costs, and offer incentives. Herbert 
A. Simon is innovative in-game theory and rational strategies. In war as in 
organizational life decisions can decide a last course of events. Likewise, decisions 
                                                             
5 Herbert A. Simon is the forerunner of present-day Social Science has become a dominant form of 
modeling based on the paradigm of rational choice. The modeling uses computer simulation that aims to 
provide an approximate representation of particular empirical applications (Simon 1973, Roger Frantz 
2003) 
involve strategies that can be targeted often sub optimal. An organization depends on 
this small and varied decisions made over time (Simon 1979, 1984, 1987)
6
.  
Design plans, building models, structuring possible plans of action are natural 
conditions of managerial rationality. It is clear that a broad idea about the faculty policy 
in the organization. Simon opposes "organization" to "personality." We can not 
understand or what an executive receives or gives what if we do not understand the 
organization where you work, because their behavior and the effect it produces in the 
other are functions of their status within that (Simon 1962, XV). This important, 
principle has been renovated to look within the organization what Robert Axelrod calls 
"cultural dissemination”7. The psychology of organizations is developed in an 
environment of routine habits and behavior, imitative, which find the mutual trust 
between managers and workers (Herbert A. Simon 1986).  
Therefore, Simon in the business intelligence activities often precede the design, 
in turn, precedes the election. But the model is not met as a simple sequence and not 
always under this scheme. What is absolutely certain is that all managerial activity is 
embedded in the decision-making. Intelligence, design, or planning and decision-
making, make up the triad categorical to understand the purpose of the organization. 
Because, this analytical framework Simon presents a conception of administrative 
behavior that incorporates the progress that was then projected in computer 
programming technologies, computer networks and psychology of rational preferences 
(Augier - March 2003). 
One question asked what Simon is behind the decisions of managers? (Simon 
2001) economic theory responds with the assumption that man is hedonistic act with the 
aim of achieving increased utilities. Getting the greatest happiness depend on how much 
energy is spent on investing in yourself. Especially, economists have to do a model of 
"economic man" who rationally chooses the best alternative course of action possible to 
maximize their performance (Simon 1979; Beckenkamp 2004). This classical version of 
utilitarianism transfers a wrong image of the real man in all its complexity, according to 
Herbert A. Simon: 
 
The business manager recognizes that the world he perceives is a drastically simplified 
model of the increasingly noisy confusion which is the real world. Is content with this 
crude simplification, because it believes the real world is, mostly empty, most real-
                                                             
6 In Ulysses and the Sirens, and Egonomics Jon Elster has also explored a wide variety of examples of 
suboptimal conditions of rationality in terms of individual and collective decisions (Elster 1997). 
7
 Cultural dissemination within organizations allows us to understand the effects of a mechanism of 
convergent social influence. If you have employees working daily in fixed locations. The basic premise is 
that the employee is more like your neighbor is most likely that the employee take some of the features of 
neighbor. In the model developed by Axelrod illustrates how local convergence can generate global 
polarization (Axelrod 1997, 1995). 
world facts are irrelevant to any given situation that he faces, and more chains 
transcendent causes and consequences are short and simple (1962, XXIV)  
 
Indeed, the need for administrative theory exists precisely because there are 
practical limits to rationality. These limits are not static as they depend on the 
organizational context within which the decision is carried out individually. Therefore, 
the task of "managing" is strongly linked to the design of an organizational context 
where the person can approach rationality in decision-making and where this approach 
is practical in terms of organizational goals (Novarese - Rizzelo 2003).  
As a result of their hypotheses, Herbert Simon proposed the model of "administrative 
man" to replace "economic man" (Simon, 1962). While maximizing economic man to 
select the best course of action of all the options, the administrative man simply 
"satisfied" in its efforts to reach a decision that is good enough. In brief, according to 
Simon in his actions on day-to-day and the manager seeks to take decisions within a 
satisfactory range of alternatives that are not necessarily the best alternative, and this in 
turn has consequences beyond the people, which means practice organizations also only 
satisfy their aims in sub optimal levels of rationality (Elster 1997).  
As an example, we could say that if managers were to make a birthday cake for 
one of his sons would make a pie that could be eaten "and not a cake that is greatly 
enjoyed and remembered by your child's classmates (perhaps this is notable for the 
excellent predisposition of managers to "delegate" to other tasks that are trivial). In 
particular, nothing this phenomenon in organizational terms and from the standpoint of 
business, we can say that in the process of management within companies are not 
looking to "maximize utility" but have a reasonable profit, instead of paying an optimal 
price we speak of a fair price, and instead of selling at the best price, sales are made at a 
price you finish a good time with this stock. 
In terms of Herbert A. Simon's, experience of managers, their qualifications and 
diplomas in the best universities and graduate courses are not enough to maximize the 
usefulness of decision-making. Further, Simon states that the "new" situation as 
temporary in the processes of products and services, a manager can run intelligently but 
be less effective and efficient. This leads to a very important consideration given that 
leaders who act motivated by this approach placed the organization in a risky situation 
when the "relative rate of change is high."  
The model of Von Neumann and Morgenstern on game theory concepts was introduced 
five independent economic theory: (1) The idea of representing the future behavior as a 
"tree", where several branches originating from each point of the election (2) The idea 
of taking the minimax (select the branch that will work best against a malicious 
adversary) as a definition of rational choice in a competitive situation (3) The idea of 
using a mixed strategy in a situation competition, to prevent the proper motions are 
noticed by the opponent (4) The idea of defining rational choice in situations of 
competition with more than two players, with regard to the possibility of forming 
coalitions
8
. (5) The demonstration that in the presence of unsafe choices, which only 
knows the probability distribution of results, make a consistent choice is to assume that 
the decision maker has a fundamental utility function, and is thus choosing to most 
expected value (Esther -Mirjam Sen 2004). 
In his conception of entrepreneurial behavior incorporates point Simon (1) but 
not (2), (3), (4), (5), all property credited with neoclassical economic theory. But the 
limits of economic rationality are expressed by Simon when he addresses the 
administrative behavior. Simon's thesis is simple but powerful:  
What is the central concern of organizational theory is the boundary between 
rational and non rational aspects of human social behavior. Management theory is, in 
particular, the theory of intentional and limited rationality of the behavior of human 




There are two issues that Simon developed rigorously in his writings on administrative 
behavior. First, the limits of rationality that run when the manager must make decisions 
that do not give time and under conditions of biased information (Sent 2004). Second, 
the phenomenology of organizational behavior that emerges from a psychology of sub 
optimal preferences. These issues are part of the background to understand how 
effectively the firm (Simon - Wash 1998).  
In analyzing the process of organizational decision-making that takes place 
within a changing context, sometimes reactive to what happens in the market and 
sometimes, when the organization takes initiatives and act proactively, not always the 
decisions come from conditions designed with any accuracy. Namely, Herbert A. Simon 
makes a distinction identifying two positions inclusive, decisions can be scheduled or 
non-scheduled without both involving their mutual exclusion (Chen 2005).  
Programmed decisions are similar to what occurs largely within organizations in 
mechanistic terms of Burns & Stalker (1961) or rational bureaucratic organization Max 
Weber. This type of programmed decisions based on the fact that are repetitive and 
respond to routines in the day-to-day operations within the organization. Beside, this 
means that before a new repetitive action of something that has been done in the past 
not to generate a new decision-making. Mechanistic organizations are making efforts to 
develop large daily routine (and control), dysfunctional consequences are widely 
                                                             
8 This was the original idea proposed in 1945 with the publication of The Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior. 
9 “Behavioral Model of rational Choice”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, February de 1955. (Simon 
1962, p. XXIII). 
referred to by Simon. In fact, if the majority of management decisions were simply 
programmed require less time on-site managers (Simon 1986, Simon - Vera 1993)
10
. 
When confronting a new situation and unstructured, or even under situations where it 
clearly emerges only or best option (something that was of concern to Frederick Taylor 
some 40 years earlier) we are facing an unplanned decision. With this sort of situation-
permanent feature of the organization, "for more effort made to find an answer in its 
corporate history or person, it is very possible that is not the optimal solution. 
Generally, it is no coincidence that in this type of situations, organizational change and 
development, companies "importing" external resources to the organization to help and 
aid. This applies Maslow beautiful phrase when he says that "if we have to solve a 
problem is a hammer, then we see almost everything as a nail." Abode all, therefore the 
best way not to see so many nails is to have a wider range of tools. The consultants and 
companies that need them are ideal for showing these phenomena, regardless of the 
results can be achieved. 
For instance, there are innovative techniques that have emerged to give a new 
twist to the business philosophy: operations research, electronic data processing, 
information technology, computer simulation, mathematical analysis, digital media - 
which were initially used for routine activities - and scheduled operations as were 
applied with administrative staff (Chen 2005, Foss 2001, Simon - Wash 1979.1998). 
Simultaneously, with the passage of time have incorporated elements of value-added 
operations in the first cycle were not scheduled and are being transformed for the 
second cycle. Eric Gaynor (World Congress of The Organization Development Institute 
in Zimbabwe, 1999) refers to the fact that it is applied especially to the "professionals" 
that make up a very significant percentage of the plant staff of large corporations. 
Today, large multinational corporations are able to make significant reductions in the 
total force of professionals as the "discretion" in making decisions is on the decline and 
makes unnecessary its "titles." 
Weber sought to show that bureaucratic organization is a rational response to the 
complexities that arise in the daily actions of the companies (Perrow 1991). More 
specifically, sought to show how bureaucratic organization can overcome the 
computational limits that people have for making decisions or other alternative forms of 
organization such as specialization or the division of labor, such as. Certainly, Weber 
was beyond the model "mechanistic" because among other things, studied in detail the 
relationship between the person and their role. However, Weber saw bureaucracy as an 
adaptive system to make use of specialized skills, ignoring some aspects of the nature of 
human behavior. 
                                                             
10 This phenomenon of substitution of skilled labor at companies under the deployment of advanced 
technologies and computer systems means one of the most significant events in recent organizational 
history. It is again necessary to recognize the original prediction of the theory of Simon. For a detailed 
assessment (Ulrich Beck 2000) 
In a perspective that contrasts with the Weberian conception, parallel studies of 
bureaucracy gave greater attention to the "consequences" in advance "of the members of 
the company. Such is the case of Merton (1936), Gouldner (1957) and Selznick (1949), 
who make mention of many of the dysfunctional consequences of bureaucracy (Perrow 
1991). These scholars suggest that the failure to run under the model "mechanistic" may 
even perpetuate it further. In summa, the models of these authors show similar aspects, 
in particular, as an independent variable to find organizational ways and how these 
control personal behavior. It appears that the rules have implications for organizational 
leaders but also gives some dysfunctional consequences for the organization.  
Merton pays attention to organizational learning dysfunctions. Participants 
suggested that learning organizational responses to similar situations which, under other 
conditions, are inappropriate for the organization. An independent variable to Merton's, 
"demand for greater control".  That must those at the top of the organization, which in 
turn influences a greater relationship between behavior and "responsibility." These 
aspects are in place within companies through standardized procedures that often 
adversely affect the performance and production (Simon 1962). Among the negative 
aspects Furthermore, Merton mentions the reduction in the amount of personalized 
relationships, internalization of norms and standards against organizational goals, and a 
simplification of the categorization for making decisions, which in turn affects the 
search alternative solutions to problems. And it includes examples of dysfunctional 
consequences in relations with customers, who have been notorious in organizations 
"service" and government agencies. 
Selznick differs from Merton (who chooses the larger variable control) and pay 
attention to the delegation of authority. The delegation has a multitude of consequences, 
including the need to better training ability. These specialized skills tend to diminish the 
difference between organizational goals and personal achievement, further 
strengthening the delegation. At the same time, causes a greater delegation 
"departmentalization" and an increase in the "bifurcation of interests" between the 
various sub-units of the company. The training also brings increased competition among 
peers what will lead to more spending on "people changes" and these increasing 
conflicts of interest. As well as, the conflict of interest increases the clash between 
different organizational sub-units, resulting in a greater difference between the aims of 
the company and the professional development of workers. In the worst case scenario 
the various sub-organizational units begin to develop ideologies for each department of 
the company.  
Gouldner's model somewhat resembles that of Merton and Selznick (Perrow 
1991). Like Merton, Gouldner is interested in the impact of bureaucratic rules and 
regulations on organizational performance. To show as a control technique to keep up 
the balance of a sub-system alters the balance of the system as a whole. Gouldner 
suggests that the creation of standards and norms in the work action oriented corporate 
participants that deviate from the goals of the company and those who intend to stay at 
the top of the pyramid. Likewise, organizational members learn to imitate the behavior 
acceptable minimum. Last, this performance of "minimum acceptable" is considered a 
failure by superiors. In turn leads to a "closer supervision" that increases the degree of 
tension within the working group, and eventually alters the "original balance was 
expected to get through the implementation of rules and norms.  
The analysis of Herbert A. Simon and James March evaluates other authors: 
Bendix (1947), Dubin (1949) and Blau (1955), critics of the bureaucratic system. But 
the most prominent approaches to Simon are the three authors to have made mention 
before (Merton, Selznick, and Gouldner), these authors exhibit dysfunctional 
consequences for organizations that adopt an array of bureaucratic type. 
 
Simon's theory on Bounded Rationality  
What better way to realize this that playing the meaning of some words from the genius 
of Herbert A. Simon in which the company says the future has to run by programmed 
decisions. Which in turn are made in the automated office is on your side? Also, 
remember that this was expressed around 1960. James March and Herbert A. Simon 
spent a considerable effort in the analysis of the bureaucracy and put the focus on the 
shortcomings of that which can be seen in the works reviewed. And nothing betters 
these authors to know in detail the limits of bureaucratic organization. 
 
The intuition and reasoning are alternative ways to solve problems, the intuition is 
similar to the perception, people often answer a difficult question to answer an easier, 
and processing of information is often superficial, because the categories are replaced 
by prototypes. All this was in our minds when we started working with Tversky in 




Indeed, the powers of Kahneman faithfully reproduce the genius of Simon meritorious 
when questioning the imponderables could expect the scope of mathematical models of 
perfect rationality sang neoclassical economic theory.  
The focus is on Herbert A. Simon who for experimental and theoretical work 
won the Nobel Prize in 1978. A job which, as Kahneman says, we propose a rational 
imponderable, nuanced, a more-or less rationality-rational (Kahneman 2003). For 
Simon: "My main goal is to understand human rationality. Annoyed by the 
inapplicability of classical optimization theory to the realities of public decision, I 
turned towards a theory of decision based on the proposition that human rationality is 
bounded (Bounded Rationality). Due to limitations in their knowledge and capacity of 
                                                             
11 Emphasis added.  
information processing human beings yearn for levels of compliance and not 
maximizing profits" (Simon 1995).  
In particular, these textual references outlining the theory that both fund has in 
sociology, economics and management. The theory of bounded rationality implies that 
human beings do not have a personal goal of maximizing the benefit of your company, 
but certain levels of compliance that are due to personal goals, subjective. These targets 
are different ways of being consistent with the thinking of the organization. Before 
entering this thought, Simon had to devote much of their forces to study the behavior 
have isolated man: his way of thinking, what drives their choices dealing with the 
circumstances (Simon - Gregg 1967).  
Afterward, to make the field internalize procedural decisions, Simon was 
inclined to isolate certain theoretical assumptions. Then induced rationality and decision 
are largely determined by human thought and the amalgamation of subjectivity - in the 
case of bureaucracy. "My interest in economics began in 1935 as part of my interest in 
human decision-making, particularly in how human beings face the complexities, 
uncertainties and conflicting goals before us daily in the personal and professional life. 
Took me pursue my goals a long but pleasant search through a maze of possibilities 
(Simon 1978).  
To understand budgetary decisions must understand the overall decision. To 
understand the decisions in general, still its rational aspects, we must study the decision-
making, and more generally the process of human thought. To do this I had to get away 
from my first studies of political science and economics, for the psychology, computer 
science and artificial intelligence "(Simon 1991, 1995). Concurrently, we also need to 
understand that nothing, not even the decision-making run in empty, since as factors, 
rationality, decision, behavior or instinct, part of the organizational context. It is not 
enough time to decide how they performed each of the factors, but the features that 
characterize the interaction between these factors. Simon did not emphasize enough on 
the latter.  
While their studies are spotless from the isolated operation of thought, in the 
contexts and circumstances of the organization, interaction that subjects have with the 
environment does not seem to be a matter of their studies. The same, Simon assumes 
that men have when they run in accordance with their own theories of reality and not in 
line with reality itself; they share same concepts through language. Thus, one might ask, 
will they be targets in accordance branched or understood differently? What is a 
manager for an exaggerated price for the president can be a very small cost. Knowing 
even accounting studies put the figure and their real costs, the potential risk of spending 
may or may not be rational for one of the two (Schwartz 2002).  
Abode all, can not think of a communication of abstract principles Frege style 
(in which case any situation is understood by both partners equal) if you think some 
bounded rationality. Limited not only by the lack of information or compliance rates, 
intuitive interaction with the person actually carried out by decision-makers is fraught 
with differences, perhaps thereby enclosing the logic of rationality within the 
organization should not be defined as limited or conformist, we must think about the 
conceptual differences which contrasts in situ force of reality (Minka-Foxall 2003).  
To hear and decide certain essential features of human thought, Herbert A. 
Simon worked with artificial intelligence coming to the invention of a program that 
solved complex problems advanced. "The theory of bounded rationality emerged from 
the study I did on recreation in Milwaukee, confirmed what had discovered by 
analyzing the tax incidence in California" (Simon, 1991, 1996). That is, this is a 
theoretical discovery work based on circumstances experimental. There, Simon 
manages to get the basic tenets than settle for his special theory of rationality:  
 
The most important years of my life, from the scientific point of view, were 1955 and 
1956 [...]. In 1955, while I kept my concerns to the administration and the economy, I 
focused particularly on the psychology of the human process of problem solving, more 
specifically, to discover the symbolic process by which people think. I quickly became a 
behavioral psychologist and a computer scientist [...] invented a computer program 
capable of reasoning on a non-digital [...] On December 15, 1955 was born the heuristic 
solution of the problems, by computer, when we demonstrated how a computer could 
use search heuristics to solve difficult problems [...] chess became a standard tool in 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence research. Our research focused on chess and 
chess players worked, who at best could analyze 100 different faces a difficult position 
"(Simon 1978, 1991).  
 
Simon then went to different perspectives of human thought to think the decision-
making process (Simon 1984, 1995). Intuitively assume that thought can be 
standardized, meaning that it is something stable, a neuronal form is maintained, and 
this does not seem to confirm that there are different realities. Bounded rationality is 
then, "rationality" to re-define its principles continuously. Therefore, decision-making 
becomes complex, especially if it is group decision-making centers, the rational 
principles fluctuate because of personal preferences; even if consistent with the goals of 
the organization differ. The question is then how to find, in the midst of a bureaucratic 
decision-making center, the best alternative to a situation?  
Simon says that "the concrete human being has very limited capacity to 
understand and compute", which obviously affects their ability to decide. And so, adds: 
"My doctoral thesis is derived from two basic principles: human beings can only do 
bounded rationality, and as a result of their cognitive limitations, tend to find with sub" 
(Simon 1991). I n other words, we have said before that thought can not be considered 
stable and in line with overall goals, people who make up the group responsible for 
decision-making matrix are offshoot of the aims, "subjective" rationally and then give 
coherence to what has decide, this time with personal interests, the result of rational 
constraints offered by the generalization which is inscribed. As a result, predictive 
learning what becomes a meta-theoretical challenge the rationality of the organization, 
only from this challenge can be generalized to the organizational goal, "Learning in the 




In solving problems, human thought is governed by software that organizes many 
simple processes of information, ordered and complex sequences that respond and adapt 
to the environment of the task and the data extracted from that environment as it 
develop sequences ... The secret to solving problems is that there is no secret: this is 
done through complex structures of simple and familiar elements "(Simon 1977).  
 
Search and satisfaction, according to Herbert A. Simon, are two central concepts in the 
theory of bounded rationality (Schelling 1989, Simon 2000). Who has to make a 
decision gets an idea about what he wants. As found, the search ends. This mode of 
choice is called satisfactory (Novarese - Rizzelo, 2003). The importance of search 
theory and satisfactory, can show how they actually make decisions based on reasonable 
efforts in the field of computing, using incomplete information, doing the impossible ... 
carry out the procedure maximize. Although, just minor complications are introduced in 
a situation of choice; the remoteness of the conduct with respect to the predictions of the 
theory of subjective expected utility is obvious. People do not even behave as if 
maximizing. In like manner, the microeconomic foundations of the classical theory of 
the firm have nothing to do with reality. Not even remotely describe the processes that 
humans use to make decisions in complex situations ... In experimental tests with 
different groups behaviors deviate significantly from suggesting the hypothesis of 
subjective expected utility. (Simon 1979).  
In view of rationality Simon operates from two basic areas of human nature, 
content and process. In the region of knowledge processes originally comes through 
perception, intuition and rational behavior
13
. In an evolution from a slow learner, 
partner, inertial and reactive up to be a separate structure, controlled, with effort, 
educated and flexible. Thus, the contents of rationality depend on the interactive 
relationships between stimuli, simulation of behavior and perception units with the 
capability of conceptual representation. Human beings develop the ability to compare 
past, present and future. For Herbert A. Simon language contributes greatly to jump the 
gap between our species and is largely the understanding of our common belonging to 
the culture and society (Simon - Kotovsky 1973).  
                                                             
12 "In December 1970 I visited Argentina, where I did something that had never done before, nor did next: 
request an interview with a celebrity. For a decade he had admired the stories of Jorge Luis Borges, and 
was intrigued by the role they played in the labyrinths. We talked, after which I concluded that there was 
no abstract model at the base of his works. He wrote stories, did not create models" (Simon 1991). 
13 Robert Nozick, 1995. 
For the non-rationality devoid of principles has been externalized, Herbert A. 
Simon writes: "I know of no systematic development of a theory of information and 
communication, which considers the attention, not information, as the scarce resource." 
Yet "Today the problem for the human information processor, both inside and outside 
an organization, is to select communications you wish to attend, from the great flood of 
information that shakes him. The whole concept of what it means to know has changed. 
In the era before the computer a person knew something when he had stored in his 
memory, so that might find on the proper database [...] now the critical task is not to 
generate, store or distribute information, but filtered so that the processing requirements 
on system components, human and mechanical, not greatly exceed their capacities" 
(Simon 1972).  
To the extent that the principles are outsourced decision-making, rationality is 
limited attach the scope, removing the obstacle of the ramification and qualification 
targets in cutting bureaucratic decisions. It is no longer a "to do" but a "how to". The 
rationale is now built concepts operational rationality (Simon - Iwsaki 1994).  
At the working relationship brought about the search for a decision and under 
some of the considerations outlined above, "Our thinking is guided not by reality but by 
our theories of reality" (Simon 1987), but if subjective theory of reality is determined by 
unchangeable and immutable concepts, performance tends to be logical. "Do not 
confuse logic with human thought" (Simon 1991), however, the functioning of the 
organization is increasingly efficient for its resemblance to the logic and this is because 
the concepts that are harder, more coercive more still. Not to be confused with the 
stillness of the decisions, they are, paradoxically, more dynamic since it fits easily into 
context.  
The rationale that drives the decisions is only one working moving concepts 
outlining a theory of reality that the person must register. Organizational culture, 
business climate, family and even the clichés of mission, vision and management are 
terms inclusive of people under the same reality. To illustrate, Simon refers to this by 
noting that the "assumptions of rationality are essential components of almost all 
sociological theories, psychological, political and anthropological know, but not in the 
version that uses the economic analysis, according to which man is a rational maximize, 
not settle for anything less than the best-possible, i.e. with the optimal". And addition, 
“in my opinion, almost all human behavior has a strong rational part, but in the broad 
sense, not in the strict sense of the economists, the economic analysis should by no 
means confined to the narrow definition of rationality and economic analysis has been 
concerned with the results of rational choice, rather than decision-making" (Simon 
1991)  
The rational expectations theory goes over the problems, contrary to solve them. 
Not interested in how decisions are made, but what decisions are made "(Simon 1978). 
And its contributions to organizational theory states: "in Administrative Behavior 
showed that decision-making is the core of the administration, and that the language of 
management theory must emerge from the logic and psychology of choice human 
"(Simon 1979). Beside, Simon's approach introduces variables not previously covered 
by economic rationality, changes in consumer preferences which depend on your 
personal psychology, the role of intuitions, moods and increasing motivation varies 
temporarily. Simon is the merit of having identified the informal components of human 
behavior and having integrated into a more dynamic conception of organizations.  
Simon's theory shows how organizational rationality has become operational and 
integrative (Simon 1984, 1998). There's no escaping all this a major aim, namely to 
maximize utility. Avoid subjective ramifications of each goal has been one of the major 
structural problems within the definition of organization and functioning as decision-
producing agent. However, leaving aside the implications, no formal relations have been 
brought outside the organization when joining what has nothing to do with them. It 
seems that Simon's theory goes in search of a subject to join the organization modulates 
its reality, is incorporated into an artificial model of coercion in the first instance, then, 
shape the rational capacity of its decisions with sociological concepts group, making 
them controlled elections. Simon does not run the control, but makes an intense 
psychological mechanism of creativity (Dasgputa 2003)
14
.  
In short, the theory of bounded rationality in Herbert A. Simon allows us to test some 
clichés prevalent in the economics of organizations. And specify in greater detail why 
the company philosophy includes a relationship consistent with personal behavior of 
agents in this situation. Bounded rationality of people acts under relative degrees of 
comparison rationality. 
 
Implications of the theory of Simon for Institutional Economics  
Accordingly, one of the most powerful ideas that are derived from the theory of Simon 
on bounded rationality is that the nature of the organizations is based on the restricted 
nature of human intelligence and behavior. Precisely because human rationality is 
limited, divisions and competence in social knowledge are necessary. In a similar vein 
to Hayek (1980), Simon sees that human knowledge advances mainly due to the task 
and the ongoing effort of hundreds of researchers find their results within democratic 
institutions.  
Both Simon and Hayek considered the analysis of institutions as essential to 
understanding the theory of human mind, but differ in that Hayek considers markets as 
the only institution capable of coordinating the decisions of people with such diverse 
interests, while Simon sees the division knowledge and coordination as a 
complementary process that marks the evolution of markets and institutions.  
                                                             
14
 A criticism of the concept of bounded Rationality employed by Simon: Nicolai Foss, "The Rhetorical 
Dimensions of Bounded Rationality: Herbert A. Simon and Organizational Economics”, in Salvatore 
Rizzello, ed. Cognitive Paradigms in Economics. London: Routledge, 2002. 
Simon genuine insight was to understand the organizational decision-making 
integrated into an evolutionary process of learning. Since the mid-70s to his most recent 
study: Choices, Values and Frames, Kahneman and Tversky (2000) investigated the 
psychological principles that govern the creation, perception and evaluation / alternative 
in the decision-making process. To explain, the authors found that preferences vary 
substantially according to the way a subject is presented ("frame"). Before stable 
preferences are reconstructed by people during the processing of the decision, a test of 
this process is provided by experimental conditions in which different representations of 
the same object of choice causes contrary preferences.  
This suggests that the crucial aspect in the decision making process is the ability 
to build new representations of problems. One point on which Simon worked hard 
during their experimental research on administrative behavior in the 50 (Earl - Elgar 
2001). How mental models with which people and institutions outlines their roles in 
society are part of a subjective dialectic overlapping interests which give dynamism and 
development of the same institutions.  
Of course, another direction of Simon influential in institutional economics is clear in 
the work of Thomas Schelling on deterrence theory and agent-based modeling. Similar 
to Herbert A. Simon emphasized the value of starting the analysis of collective behavior 
with rules of behavior for people and use simulation to explore the implications of the 
results of a large-scale. Institutional behaviors are not a mere aggregation of personal 
behavior, but organizations significantly affect how people choose. Schelling called this 
interaction Micromotives and Macrobehavior (Schelling 1978).  
“People follow many guidance and separates many ways, says Schelling. There 
is segregation of sex, age, income, language, religion, color, taste, and accidents of 
historical circumstances” (Schelling 1978, 130). Some segregation is a result of the 
practices of organizations. Another result is the interplay of each choice that 
discriminates. Another result is specialized communications systems, such as languages. 
In summa, some segregation is a corollary of other forms of segregation: the residence 
is correlated with the location of employment and transport. Schelling relates 
analytically by modeling later called tipping, personal incentives and collective results 
nostra how segregation involved in some quantitative restrictions, the mechanisms 
separating, sorting and conflict.  
Schelling's analysis Macrobehavior and Micromotives and relevant to the 
economic study of institutions because it shows how numerical quotas or ratio can 
affect the probability of a stable balance of a given population. It is also important to 
understand how large groups of people come to concerted action. The logic of 
Schelling's model illustrates, such as, that consensus is not enough to do numerical 
balance. There are test cases identified in his work that relate extreme stable equilibrium 
within the same group (black or white during the worst period of racism in America.) 
There may be potential stable equilibrium, or more, the first positions and movements 
rates decide which of two conflicting groups will be imposed.  
Ownership, the Schelling model is to make co-extensive relations between 
personal behavior and collective action. Furthermore, identifies the remarkable 
observations of Herbert A. Simon on the obvious organizational equilibrium deviations 
that take place under the psychology of emotions.  
Eduardo Wiesner (1997) Simon puts the focus on the theoretical framework of 
institutional model. More precisely, it highlights the positive properties of inductive and 
experimental approach of Simon, in contrast to the deductive and abstract models of 
economic theory. Furthermore, Simon incorporates the idea that there are no magic 
formulas to solve problems in economics. Collective decisions are the result of 
psychological factors of choice for the emotions involved. The rationality bounded sets 
limits that result in the design of more sensible economic policies with the difficulties of 
economic equity and spending.  
 
Conclusions  
This article set out to make a basic presentation of the central aspects of the work of 
Herbert A. Simon, for analyzing the economics of organizations. We have presented the 
relations of the theory of Herbert A. Simon with a tradition in economics going back to 
organizational Max Weber. To get to highlight, the legacy of Simon in the context of 
the institutional theory of economic behavior reflected in the work of Kahneman and 
Schelling.  
Institutional economics from a long tradition that goes back to Adam Smith 
recognizes the limited nature of the rationality of the actors, the limits within which a 
decision can be the result of selfish or altruistic reasons, or both. Thus, that collective 
decisions are partly derived from personal psychological expressivities is a wise 
economic philosophy in classics such as Bentham, Stuart Mill and Marshall. This 
subjective part of the operator is explored by Herbert A. Simon with new tools: biology, 
computer simulation systems, and mathematical modeling programs.  
Simon's influence in the contemporary debate on the social sciences is gaining 
strength as the original property issues such as bounded Rationality, organizations, 
decision theory, collective action, individual behavior. The advantage of Simon with 
regard to the inherited tradition is that it manages to join a front-line philosophical 
reflection in a context as pragmatic as the signature field and organizational efficiency. 
In conclusion, Simon brings to the theory of administrative behavior an epistemological 
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